Extending Machine Language Models toward Human-Level Language Understanding by McClelland, James et al.
Extending Machine Language Models toward
Human-Level Language Understanding
James L. McClellanda,b,2, Felix Hillb,2, Maja Rudolphc,2, Jason Baldridged,1,2, and Hinrich Schützee,1,2
aStanford University, Stanford, CA 94305, USA; bDeepMind, London N1C 4AG, UK; cBosch Center for Artificial Intelligence, Renningen, 71272, Germany; dGoogle Research,
Austin, TX 78701, USA; eLMU Munich, Munich, 80538, Germany
This manuscript was compiled on December 13, 2019
Language is central to human intelligence. We review recent break-
throughs in machine language processing and consider what re-
mains to be achieved. Recent approaches rely on domain general
principles of learning and representation captured in artificial neu-
ral networks. Most current models, however, focus too closely on
language itself. In humans, language is part of a larger system for
acquiring, representing, and communicating about objects and sit-
uations in the physical and social world, and future machine lan-
guage models should emulate such a system. We describe exist-
ing machine models linking language to concrete situations, and
point toward extensions to address more abstract cases. Human
language processing exploits complementary learning systems, in-
cluding a deep neural network-like learning system that learns grad-
ually as machine systems do, as well as a fast-learning system that
supports learning new information quickly. Adding such a system to
machine language models will be an important further step toward
truly human-like language understanding.
Language Understanding | Natural Language Processing | Situation
Models | Machine Language Models | Brain System for Understanding
Many of the most impressive recent successes of machine in-
telligence have appeared in the domain of language. Machines
can now better identify the words we speak and respond in
ever more natural sounding voices. More impressive still is
modern machine translation (1). Anyone with a smartphone
has access to applications that allow them to say a sentence in
one language and then see and hear its translation in another.
Human ability still far exceeds machines in most language
tasks, but these systems work well enough to be used by
billions of people everyday.
What underlies these successes, and what limitations do
these systems face? We argue that successes to date come from
ever more effective methods for exploiting principles of neural
computation that human language users also exploit. We then
note that the work remains limited in that it largely treats
language separately from the larger task of understanding
the world around us. This leads us to propose an integrated
approach to building a system that truly understands, in which
language plays a key role in concert with other sources of input.
We discuss the challenges facing further development of the
approach and propose future steps toward addressing these
challenges.
Principles of Neural Computation
The principles of neural computation are domain general prin-
ciples inspired by the human brain. They were first articulated
in the 1950s (2) and further developed in the 1980s in the
Parallel Distributed Processing (PDP) framework for modeling
cognition (3). A central idea of this approach is that struc-
ture in language and other cognitive domains is an emergent
phenomenon, captured in learned connection weights and re-
sulting in context-sensitive, distributed representations whose
characteristics reflect a gradual, input-statistics dependent,
learning process (4). The models treat the symbols and rules
of classical linguistic theory as consequences of processing and
learning, not entities whose structure must be built in. Instead
of discrete symbols for linguistic units, these models rely on
patterns of activity often called embeddings over arrays of
neuron-like processing units. Instead of explicit systems of
rules, they rely on learned matrices of connection weights to
map patterns on one set of units into patterns on others.
Another key principle is mutual constraint satisfaction (5).
For example, the meaning of a sentence depends on its struc-
ture (its organization into constituent phrases); but so too can
the structure depend on the meaning. Consider the sentence A
boy hit a man with a __. If the missing word is bat, with a bat
is read as part of a verb phrase headed by hit, and specifies the
instrument used to carry out the action. But if beard fills the
blank, with a beard is a part of a noun phrase describing who
was hit. Even the segmentation of spoken or written language
into elementary segments (e.g., letters) depends in part on
meaning and context, as illustrated in Fig. 1. Rumelhart (5)
sketched an interactive model of language understanding in
which estimates of probabilities about all aspects of an input
constrain estimates of the probability of every other aspect.
The idea was captured in a model of context effects in per-
ception (6). Later work (7, 8) linked these ideas to energy
minimization in statistical physics. Neural language modeling
research, which we now describe, incorporates these principles.
Neural Language Modeling
An Early Neural Language Model. Elman (9) built on the prin-
ciples above to demonstrate how neural models can capture
key characteristics of language structure through learning, a
feat once considered impossible (10). The model provides a
starting point for understanding recent developments. Elman
used the recurrent neural network shown in Fig. 2a. The
network was trained to predict the next word in a sequence
(w(t+1)) based on the current word (w(t)) and its own hidden
(that is, learned internal) representation from the previous
time step (h(t − 1)). These two inputs are each multiplied
by a matrix of connection weights (represented by the arrows
labeled Whi and Whh) to produce vectors that are added to
produce a vector of inputs to the hidden layer of units. The
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Fig. 1. Two handwritten sentences illustrating how context influences the identification
of letters in written text. The visual input we read as went in the first sentence and
event in the second is the same bit of Rumelhart’s handwriting, cut and pasted into
each of the two contexts. Reprinted from (5).
elements of this vector undergo a transformation limiting the
range of activation values, resulting in the hidden layer repre-
sentation. This in turn is multiplied with the matrix of weights
to the output layer from the hidden layer (Woh) to generate a
vector used to predict the probability of each of the possible
successor words. Learning in this and other neural models is
based on the discrepancy between the network’s output and
the actual next word; the values of the connection weights
are adjusted by a small amount to reduce the discrepancy.
The network is called recurrent because the same connection
weights (denoted by arrows in the figure) are used to process
each successive word; the hidden representation h(t) becomes
the context representation h(t− 1) for the next time step.
Elman demonstrated two crucial findings. First, after train-
ing his network to predict the next word in simple sentences like
man eats bread, dog chases cat, and girl sleeps, the network’s
representations captured the syntactic distinction between
nouns and verbs (9). It also captured interpretable subcate-
gories, as shown by a hierarchical clustering of the hidden-layer
pattern (h(t)) for each word in the training materials (Fig. 2b).
This illustrates a key feature of learned representations in neu-
ral models: they capture specific as well as general or abstract
information. By using a different learned representation for
each word, the specific predictive consequences of that word
can be exploited. Because representations for words that make
similar predictions are similar, and because neural networks
exploit similarity, the network can share knowledge about
predictions among related words. Second, Elman (11) used
both simple sentences like boy chases dogs and more complex
ones like boy who sees girls chases dogs. In the more complex
case, the verb chases must agree with the first noun (boy), not
the closest noun (girls), since the sentence contains a main
clause (boy chases dogs) interrupted by an embedded clause
(boy [who] sees girls). The model learned to predict the verb
form correctly despite the intervening clause, showing that it
acquired sensitivity to the syntactic structure of language, and
not just local co-occurrence statistics in its learned connections
and distributed representations.
Scaling Up to Process Natural Text. Elman’s task—predicting
the next word in a sequence—has been central to neural lan-
guage modeling. However, Elman trained his networks with
only tiny fragments of what were effectively toy languages.
For many years, it seemed they would not scale up. Beginning
about 10 years ago, advances in machine language process-
ing began to overcome this limitation for neural models. We
describe two crucial developments next.
Long-distance dependencies and pretrained word embeddings. A
challenge for language prediction is the indefinite length of
Fig. 2. (a) Elman’s (1990) simple recurrent network and (b) his hierarchical clustering
of the representations it learned, reprinted from (9).
the context that might be relevant. Consider this passage:
John put some beer in a cooler and went out with his
friends to play volleyball. Soon after he left, someone
took the beer out of the cooler. John and his friends
were thirsty after the game, and went back to his
place for some beers. When John opened the cooler,
he discovered that the beer was ___.
Here a reader expects the missing word to be gone. Yet if
we replaced someone took the beer with someone took the ice
the expected word would be warm instead. Furthermore, any
amount of additional text between beer and gone would not
change the predictive relationship. Elman’s network could
take only a few words of context into account, reflecting a
larger challenge known as the vanishing gradient problem (12).
In essence, the magnitude of the learning signal that deter-
mines the adjustments to connection weights tends to decrease
exponentially as the number of layers of weights between an
input and an output increases. The development of neural
network modules called Long-Short-Term-Memory (LSTM)
modules (13) that partially overcame this limitation was there-
fore crucial, greatly increasing the contextual range of neural
models. In another crucial development, researchers began
to use pre-trained word embeddings derived from learning
predictive relationships among words (14, 15). When training
a neural model for a specific task, such embeddings could then
be used to directly represent training words in the model’s
input. The embeddings were based on the aggregate statistics
of large text corpora, and captured both general and specific
predictive relationships, supporting generalization at both gen-
eral and specific levels. Using these embeddings, task-focused
models trained with relatively small data sets could generalize
what they learned from training on frequent words (such as
sofa) to infrequent words with similar predictive relationships
(such as settee).
A limitation of the above approach is that the same rep-
resentation of a word is used every time it occurs, regardless
of context. However, in line with the principle of mutual
constraint satisfaction, humans interpret words, including am-
biguous words like bank, in accordance with the context (16),
rapidly assigning a contextually appropriate meaning to each
word based on all other words. A fixed embedding also limits
predicting other words; the predictive implication of the word
bank depends on which kind of bank is involved. Initial steps
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Fig. 3. High-level depiction of one stage of the bidirectional attention architecture,
shown constructing a contextually appropriate representation of bank based on other
words in the same sentence. Diagonal lines show how inputs from other positions
reach bank ’s position; the same occurs at all word positions. See text for details.
toward context sensitivity (17) recognize this limitation. We
consider a fuller solution in the next section.
Attention and fully contextualized embeddings. Breakthroughs in
neural language modeling have come from recent models that
construct fully contextualized word representations (18–22).
The models represent words via a mutual constraint satis-
faction process in which each word in a text span influences
the representation of every other word. BERT (20) is a key
model in this class, illustrated in Fig. 3 as it encodes the end
of the sentence John reached the bank of the river (example
from (23)). An initial context-independent representation of
each word is first combined with a positional representation
(bottom row of boxes in the figure). Then, a separate copy of
the same neural network module updates the representation in
each position with input from all other positions. This process
uses queries (red) at each position that are compared to keys
(yellow) at all positions to form weightings (mauve boxes) that
determine how strongly the values (blue) from each position
contribute to the combined attention vectors (grey boxes) that
provide context-sensitivity. The computation iterates over
many layers, allowing words whose representations have been
influenced by their context to influence the representations of
other words. The process allows selection among alternative
distinct meanings of a word like bank as well as graded shading
of word meaning by context, for example assigning different
emotional valance to the dogs in the dog wagged its tail and
the dog snarled.
Key ingredients of the contemporary models are (i) bidi-
rectionality of information flow during processing and (ii) an
attention mechanism, which replaces the LSTM mechanism to
enhance the exploitation of context. Bidirectionality matters
because the meaning of a word in context depends on what
comes after it as well as what comes before; in the example
sentence, the last word, river, determines the meaning of bank.
While it is remarkable how much can be done with strictly left-
to-right constraint propagation (24), bidirectionality allows
neural models to implement a mutual constraint satisfaction
process in which the representation of each word depends on
all other words. The attention mechanism distinguishes these
models from earlier LSTM-based neural language models, and
is used in both bidirectional and left-to-right models. Atten-
tion has proven to be even more effective than the LSTM
mechanism in allowing networks to capture long-distance de-
pendencies. Rather than requiring information about a context
word to reach a target word through an iteration of the LSTM
for every intervening word, the context reaches the target
directly. Likewise, gradient learning signals skip over the inter-
vening words, avoiding the dissipation of learning signal that
would otherwise occur.
BERT-based models have produced remarkable improve-
ments on a wide range of language tasks (25, 26). The models
can be pre-trained on massive text corpora, providing useful
representations for subsequent tasks for which little specific
training data exists (27). These models seem to capture syn-
tactic, semantic and world knowledge and they are beginning
to address tasks once thought beyond their reach. For ex-
ample, Winograd Schema challenge (28) requires determining
the referent of a pronoun (here it) in a sentence such as The
trophy did not fit in the suitcase because it was too ___. For a
person, world knowledge tells us that if the missing word is big
the referent must be the trophy, but if it is small the referent
must be the suitcase. The latest models achieve ever-higher
scores on benchmarks including variants of the Winograd chal-
lenge (29). However, variants of test materials that do not
fool humans continue to stymie even the best models (30), and
further refinements in the models and their assessment will be
required before it will be clear what such models can achieve.
The Human Integrated Understanding System (IUS)
Situations and objects. Despite the successes of neural lan-
guage modeling, an important limitation is that these models
are purely language based. We need models in which lan-
guage is a part of an integrated understanding system (IUS)
for understanding and communicating about the situations
we encounter and the objects that participate in them. Rep-
resentations of situations constitute our models of our world
and guide our behavior and our interpretation of language.
Indeed, resolving the referent of the pronoun in a Winograd
sentence would follow from building a representation of the
situation the sentence describes. In the situation in which a
trombone does not fit in a suitcase, the natural reason would
be that the trombone is too big or the suitcase too small; the
identity of the referent of the pronoun follows from realizing
this. Thus, solving the Winograd Schema challenge is a natu-
ral byproduct of the human language understanding process.
In short, we argue that language evolved for communication
about situations and our systems should address this goal.
Situations can be concrete and static, such as one where
a cat is on a mat, or they may be events such as one where
a boy hits a ball. They can be conceptual, social or legal,
such as one where a court invalidates a law. They may even
be imaginary. The objects may be real or fictitious physical
objects or locations; animals, persons, groups or organizations;
beliefs or other states of mind; or entities such as theories,
laws or constitutions. Here we focus on concrete situations,
considering other cases below. Our proposal builds on classic
work in linguistics (31, 32), human cognition (33), artificial
intelligence (34), and an early PDP model (35) and dovetails
with an emerging perspective in cognitive neuroscience (36).
As humans process language, we construct a representation
of the situation the language describes from the stream of
words and other available information. Words and their se-
quencing serve as clues to meaning (37) that jointly constrain
the understanding of the situation and each object participat-
ing in it (35). Consider this passage:
John spread jam on a slice of bread. The knife had
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been dipped in poison. John ate the bread and soon
began to feel sick.
We can make many inferences here: that the jam was spread
with the poisoned knife, that some of the poison was trans-
ferred to the bread, and that this may have led to John’s
sickness. Note that the entities here are objects, not words,
and the situation could instead be conveyed by a silent movie.
Evidence that humans construct situation representations
comes from classic work by Bransford and colleagues (33, 38).
This work demonstrates that (1) we understand and remember
texts better when we can relate the statements in the text
to a familiar situation; (2) information that conveys aspects
of the situation can be provided by a picture accompanying
the text; (3) the characteristics of the objects we remember
depend on the situations in which they occurred in a text;
(4) we represent in memory objects not explicitly mentioned
in texts; and (5) after hearing a sentence describing spatial
or conceptual relationships among objects, we retain mem-
ory for these relationships rather than the linguistic input.
Further, evidence from eye movements shows that people use
linguistic and non-linguistic input jointly and immediately as
they process language in context (39). For example, just after
hearing The man will drink ... participants look at a full wine
glass rather than an empty beer glass (40). After hearing The
man drank, they look at the empty beer glass. Thus, language
understanding involves constructing–in real time–a represen-
tation of the situation being described by language input,
including the objects involved and their spatial relationships
with each other, using visual and linguistic inputs.
The understanding system in the brain. Fig. 4 presents a de-
piction of our proposed integrated understanding system. Our
proposal is both a theory of the brain basis of understanding
and a proposed architecture for future language understanding
research. It is largely consistent with proposals in (36). First,
we focus on a part of the system, called the neocortical sys-
tem, that is sufficient to combine linguistic and non-linguistic
input to understand the object and situation referred to upon
hearing a sentence containing the word bat while observing
a corresponding situation in the world. This system consists
of the blue ovals (corresponding to pools of neurons in the
brain) and blue arrows (connections between these pools) in
the figure. One population subserves a visual representa-
tion/embedding of the given situation, and another subserves
a non-semantic linguistic representation capturing the sound
structure (phonology) of co-occurring spoken language. The
third represents objects participating in the situation, and
the fourth represents the overall situation itself. Within each
pool, and between each connected pair of pools, the neurons
are reciprocally interconnected via learning-dependent path-
ways allowing mutual constraint satisfaction among all of the
elements of each of the embedding types. Brain regions for
representing visual and linguistic inputs are well-established,
and the evidence for their involvement in a mutual constraint
satisfaction process is substantial (41). Here we focus on the
evidence for object and situation representations in the brain.
Object representations. A brain area near the front of the tempo-
ral lobe houses neurons whose activity provides an embedding
capturing the properties of an object someone is considering
(42). Damage to this area impairs the ability to name objects,
to grasp objects correctly in service of their intended use, to
Fig. 4. Proposed integrated understanding system (IUS). The blue box contains
the neocortical system, with each oval forming an embedding (representation) of a
specific kind of information. Blue arrows represent learned connections that allow
the embeddings to constrain each other. The red box contains the medial temporal
lobe system, thought to provide a network that stores an integrated embedding of the
neocortical system state. The red arrow represents fast-learning connections that
bind the elements of this embedding together for later reactivation and use. Green
arrows connecting the red and blue ovals support bidirectional influences between
the two systems. (A) and (B) are two example inputs discussed in the main text.
match objects with their names or the sounds that they make,
and to pair objects that go together with each other, either
from their names or from pictures. Models that capture these
findings (43) treat this area as the hidden layer of an interac-
tive, recurrent network with bidirectional connections to other
layers corresponding to brain areas that represent different
types of object properties including the object’s name. In these
models, an input to any of these other layers activates the cor-
responding pattern in the hidden layer, which in turn activates
the corresponding patterns in the other layers, supporting, for
example, the ability to produce the name of an object from
visual input. Damage (simulated by removal of neurons in the
hidden layer) degrades the model’s representations, capturing
the patterns of errors made by patients with the condition.
Situation representations. The situation representation specifies
the event or situation conveyed by visual and/or language
input. Evidence from behavioral studies indicates that con-
struction of a situation representation can occur with or with-
out language input (44) or through the convergent influence
of both sources of information (40). Cognitive neuroscience
research supports the idea that the situation representation
arises in a set of interconnected brain areas primarily located
in the frontal and parietal lobes (36, 45). In recent work, brain
imaging data is used to analyze the time-varying patterns
of neural activity that arise during the processing of a tem-
porally extended event sequence. The activity patterns that
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represent corresponding events in a sequence are largely the
same, whether the information about the sequence comes from
watching a movie, hearing or reading a narrative description,
or recalling the movie after having seen it (46, 47).
Situation-specific constraints. An important feature of our brain-
inspired proposal is the use of distinct situation and object
representations, and the idea that the constraints on the par-
ticipating objects are mediated by the situation representation.
The advantage of this is that it allows these constraints to
be situation-specific. For example, the dogs in the events de-
scribed by the sentences the boy ran to the dog and the boy ran
from the dog are likely to be different, and a comprehender will
represent them differently (38). In general, context-sensitivity
is best captured by a mediating representation rather than
direct associations among constituents (48). While BERT-like
models might partially capture such constraints implicitly, an
integrated situation representation may be more effective.
In summary, the brain contains distinct areas that represent
each input modality and the objects and situations conveyed
through them, computing these representations through a
mutual constraint satisfaction process combining language and
other inputs. Emulating this architecture in machines could
contribute to achieving human-level language understanding.
What would a computational instantiation of our system look
like? It is likely that a biologically realistic version would
differ in some ways from the most effective machine version.
Contemporary attention-based language models can deploy
attention over tens to thousands of words kept in their current
system state, but evidence from brain imaging data collected
during movie comprehension suggests that activation states in
visual, speech, and object areas change rapidly as events unfold,
while the brain state tends to be more constant, changing only
at event boundaries in brain areas associated with situation
representations (47). In humans, spanning longer temporal
windows, including multi-event narratives, appears to require
the complementary learning system we consider next.
Complementary Learning Systems. Learning plays a crucial
role in understanding. The knowledge in the connection
weights in the neural networks we have described is acquired
through the accumulation of very small adjustments based on
each experience. The connection weights gradually become
sensitive to subtle higher-order statistical relationships, taking
more and more context into account as learning continues (49),
and exhibiting sensitivity both to general and recurring specific
information (e.g., names of close friends and famous people).
In our proposed architecture, this gradual process occurs in
all the pathways represented by the blue arrows in Fig. 4, just
as it does in the artificial neural language models considered
above. However, this learning mechanism is not well suited to
acquiring new information rapidly, and attempting to learn
specific new information quickly by focused repetition leads
to catastrophic interference with what is already known (50).
Yet, humans can often rely on information presented just
once at an arbitrary time in the past to inform our current
understanding. Returning to the beer John left in the cooler,
to anticipate that John will not find the beer when he opens
the cooler again, we must rely on information acquired when
we first heard about the beer being stolen. Such situations
are ubiquitous, and a learning system must be able to exploit
such information, but BERT and the other models described
previously are limited in this way. Though some models hold
long word sequences in an active state, when one text is
replaced with another, only the small connection adjustments
described above remain, leaving these systems without access
to the specifics of the prior information.
The human brain contains a system that addresses this
limitation. Consider a situation in which someone sees a pre-
viously unfamiliar object and hears a spoken statement about
it, as illustrated in Fig. 4B. The visual input provides one
source of information about the object (a previously unfamiliar
animal), while the linguistic input provides its name. Humans
show robust learning after just two brief exposures to such
pairings (51). This form of learning depends on the hippocam-
pus and adjacent areas in the medial temporal lobes (MTL)
of the brain (51). While details of the role of the MTL in
learning and memory continue to be debated (52, 53), there is
consensus that the MTL is crucial for the initial formation of
new memories, including memories for specific events and their
constituent objects and situations, while general knowledge,
the ability to understand language, and previously acquired
skills are unaffected by MTL damage.
The evidence from MTL damage suggests there is a fast
learning system in the MTL. According to complementary
learning systems theory (CLST) (54–56) this system (shown
in red in Fig. 4) provides an integrated representation of the
understanding system state, and employs modifiable connec-
tions within the MTL (red arrow) that can change rapidly to
support new learning based on a single experience. The green
arrows represent connections that carry information between
the neocortical (blue) and MTL (red) systems so the systems
can influence each other.
Let us consider how, according to CLST, a human can learn
about the numbat (see Fig. 4B) from an experience seeing
it and hearing a sentence about it (56). The input to the
MTL is thought to be an embedding that captures (i.e., can
be used to reconstruct) the patterns in the neocortical areas
that arise from the experience. Networks within the MTL (not
shown) map the MTL input representation to a sparser one
deep inside the MTL, maximizing distinctness and minimizing
interference among experiences (54). Large connection weight
changes within the MTL associate the elements of the sparse
representation with each other and with the MTL input repre-
sentation. When the person hears the word numbat in a later
situation, connections to the MTL from the neocortex activate
neurons in the MTL input representation. The weight changes
that occurred on prior exposure support the reconstruction
of the complete MTL representation, and return connections
to the neocortex then support approximate reconstruction of
the visual, speech, object and situation representations formed
during the initial exposure to the numbat. These representa-
tions are the explicit memory for the prior experience, allowing
the cortical network to use what it learned from one prior
exposure to contribute to understanding the new situation.
Integrating information into the neocortex. How can knowledge ini-
tially dependent on the MTL be integrated into the neocor-
tex? According to CLST (55), the neocortex learns gradually
through interleaved presentations of new and familiar items;
this process avoids interference of new items with what is al-
ready known. Interleaved learning can occur through ongoing
experience, as would happen if, for example, we acquire a pet
numbat that we then see every day, while continuing to have
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other experiences. Interleaving may also occur during rest
or sleep through reactivation and replay of patterns stored
in the MTL: Indeed, spontaneous replay of short snippets of
previously experienced episodes occurs within the MTL during
sleep and between behavioral episodes (see (56) for review).
In summary, the human brain contains complementary
learning systems that support the simultaneous use of many
sources of information as we seek to understand an experienced
situation. One of these systems acquires an integrated system
of knowledge gradually through interleaved learning, includ-
ing our knowledge of the meanings of words, the properties
of frequently-encountered objects, and the characteristics of
familiar situations. The other complements this system to
allow information from specific experiences to be brought to
bear on the interpretation of a current situation.
Toward an Artificial Integrated Understanding System
Here we consider current deep learning research that is taking
steps consistent with our IUS proposal, and point toward fu-
ture directions that will be needed to achieve a truly integrated
and fully functional understanding system. We begin within
the context of language grounded within concrete visual and
physical situations, then consider the role of memory, and
finally turn to the extension of the approach to address under-
standing of more abstract objects, situations, and relations.
Mapping vision and language to representations of objects.
How might a model learn about situations that can occur
in the world? The need for an artificial system of language
understanding to be grounded in the external world has long
been discussed. An early example is Winograd’s SHRDLU
system (57), which produced and responded to language about
a simulated physical world. Deep learning has enabled joint,
end-to-end training of perceptual input and language (i.e., in
a single synchronous optimization process). Recent advances
with such models have greatly improved performance, resulting
in applications transforming user experiences. When presented
with a photograph, networks can now answer questions such
as what is the man holding? or what color is the woman’s
shirt? (58), demonstrating an ability to combine information
from vision and language to understand a class of situations.
A very recent model (59) explicitly represents the objects in
a scene, their properties, and their relations to other objects in
a designed scene graph with slots for objects, their properties,
and relations. It encodes questions as a series of instructions
to find a target object or relation by searching the graph to
answer a query. For example, the question what is the object
beside the yellow bowl? can be answered by finding the yellow
bowl, finding an object linked to it with the ‘beside’ relation,
and then reading out this object’s identity. The approach
advances the state of the art, though a large gap relative
to humans remains. The model shares important properties
with our proposal in that it explicitly treats language input
as querying the model’s representation of the objects in the
scene, and their conceptual properties. A natural extension
consistent with IUS would be to build up scene representations
using a combination of visual input and language, allowing
text to enrich the representations of objects and relations.
A question this work raises is whether to build structured
representations into one’s model. This is advocated in (59),
but natural structure exhibits flexible embedding relationships
and is often only approximately characterized by explicit tax-
onomies, motivating use of emergent connection-based rather
than hard-coded representational structures (60). A challenge,
then, is to achieve comparable performance with models in
which these concept-based object and relational representa-
tions emerge through learning.
Embodied models for language understanding. Beyond the
integration of vision and language, as illustrated in Fig. 4, we
see progress coming from an even fuller integration of many
additional information sources. Every source provides a basis
for distinct learning objectives and enables information that
is salient in one source to bootstrap learning and inference in
the other. Important additional sources of information include
non-language sound, touch and force-sensing, and information
about one’s own actions.
Incorporating additional information sources will allow an
IUS to go beyond answering questions about static images.
Since image data has no temporal aspect, such models lack
experience of events or processes. While models that jointly
process video and language (61) may acquire some sensitiv-
ity to event structure and commonplace causal relationships,
these systems do not make choices affecting the world they
observe. Ultimately, an ability to link one’s actions to their
consequences as one intervenes in the observed flow of events
and interacts with other agents should provide the strongest
basis for acquiring notions of cause and effect, of agency, and
of self and others.
These considerations motivate recent work on agent-
based language learning in simulated interactive 3D environ-
ments (62–65). In (66), an agent was trained to identify, lift,
carry and place objects relative to other objects in a virtual
room, as specified by simplified language instructions. At each
time step, the agent received a first-person visual observation
(pixel-based image) that it processed to produce a representa-
tion of the scene. This was concatenated to the final state of
an LSTM that processed the instruction, then passed to an
integrative LSTM whose output was used to select a motor
action. The agent gradually learned to follow instructions of
the form find a pencil, lift up a basketball and put the teddy
bear on the bed, encompassing 50 objects, and requiring up
to 70 action steps to complete. Such instructions require the
construction of representations based on language stimuli that
enable the identification of objects and relations across space
and time, and the integration of this information to inform mo-
tor behaviors. Importantly, without building in explicit object
representations, the system supported the interpretation of
novel instructions. For instance, an agent trained to lift a set
of 20 objects in the environment, but only trained to put 10 of
those in a specific location could place the remaining objects
in the same location on command with over 90% accuracy.
Neural models often fail to exhibit systematic generaliza-
tion, leading some to propose that more structure should be
built in (67). While the agent’s level of systematicity does
not reach human levels, this work suggests that grounding lan-
guage learning can help support systematicity without building
it in. Critically, the agent’s systematicity was contingent on
the ego-centric, multimodal and temporally-extended expe-
rience of the agent. On the same set of generalization tests,
both an alternative agent with a fixed perspective on a 2D grid
world and a static neural network classifier that received only
individual still image stimuli exhibited significantly worse gen-
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Fig. 5. Left: the (allocentric) agent perspective in a 2D grid-world. The text indicates
the language instruction, requiring the agent (white striped cell) to visit one of the
red figures and move it to the white square. Right: the first-person perspective of the
situated agent, addressing an equivalent task to the one posed in the grid world.
eralization that a fully situated agent (Fig. 5). This underlines
how affording neural networks access to rich, multi-modal
interactive environments can stimulate the development of
capacities that are essential for language learning.
Despite these promising signs, achieving fully human levels
of generalization remains an important challenge. We propose
that incorporating an MTL-like fast learning system will help
address this by allowing new words to be linked to the corre-
sponding object from just a single episode supporting use of
the word to refer to the referent in other situations.
An artificial fast learning system. What might a fast learning
system in an implementation of an integrated understanding
system look like? The memory system in the differentiable
neural computer (DNC) (68) is one possibility. These systems
store embeddings derived from past episodes in slots that
could store Integrated System State representations like those
we attribute to the human MTL. Alternatively, they could
store the entire ensemble of states across the visual, speech,
object, and situation representations. Though we do not
believe the brain has a separate slot for each memory, it can
be useful to model it as though it does (56), and artificial
systems with indefinite capacity could exceed human abilities
in this regard. How might the retrieval of relevant information
work in such a system? The DNC employs a querying system
similar to the one in BERT and to proposals in the human
memory literature, whereby the representation retrieved from
the MTL is weighted by the degree of match between a query
(which we would treat as coming from the neocortex) and each
vector stored in memory. Close matches are favored in this
computation (69), so that when there is a unique match (such
as a single memory containing a once seen word like numbat),
the corresponding object and situation representation could
be retrieved. Retrieval could be based on a combination of
context and item information, similar to human memory (70).
Working out the details of such a system presents an exciting
research direction for the future.
Beyond concrete situations. Our discussion has focused pri-
marily on concrete situations. However, language allows us to
discuss abstract ideas and situations, where grounding in the
physical world can be very indirect and our learning about
it comes primarily from language-based materials. Consider,
for example, an understanding of Brexit. Concrete events
involving actual people have occurred, but the issues and ques-
tions under consideration can only be communicated through
language. What is the way forward toward developing models
that can understand such a complex situation?
Language may have evolved in part to support transmission
of complex, hierarchical knowledge about tools (71). How-
ever, utterances also had to support abstraction and complex
dependencies between concrete objects, as well as social re-
lationships between speakers. Words themselves provided a
new abstract substrate for characterizing other words (72).
Word embeddings are one implementation of this substrate:
they can characterize abstract words like justice and represents
without directly grounding them. In humans, encyclopedic
knowledge grounded in such representations can be acquired
in an MTL-dependent way from reading an encyclopedia arti-
cle just once. For machines, forming integrated system state
representations capturing the content and using a DNC-like
system for their storage and retrieval might provide a starting
place for enabling such knowledge to be acquired and used
effectively.
That said, words are uttered in real world contexts and there
is a continuum between grounding and language-based linking
for different words and different uses of words. For example,
career is not only linked to other abstract words like work and
specialization but also to more grounded concepts such as path
and its extended metaphorical use for discussing the means to
achieve goals (72). Embodied, simulation-based approaches
to meaning (73, 74) build on this observation to bridge from
concrete to abstract situations via metaphor. They posit
that understanding words like grasp is directly linked to neural
representations of the action of grabbing and that this circuitry
is recruited for understanding the word in contexts such as
grasping an idea. We consider situated agents as a critical
catalyst for learning about how to represent and compose
concepts pertaining to spatial, physical and other perceptually
immediate phenomena—thereby providing a grounded edifice
that can connect to both the low level brain circuitry for motor
action and to representations derived primarily from language.
Conclusion. Language does not stand alone. The integrated
understanding system in the brain connects language to rep-
resentations of objects and situations and enhances language
understanding by exploiting the full range of our multi-sensory
experience of the world, our representations of our motor
actions, and our memory of previous situations. We have ar-
gued that the next generation language understanding system
should emulate this system in the brain and we have sketched
some aspects of the form such a system might take. While
we have emphasized understanding of concrete situations, we
have argued that understanding more abstract language builds
upon this concrete foundation, pointing toward the possibility
that it may someday be possible to build artificial systems that
understand abstract situations far beyond the concrete and
the here-and-now. In sum, we have proposed that modeling
the integrated understanding system in the brain will take us
closer to capturing human-level language understanding and
intelligence.
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